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variables. These theoretically based measures are applied empirically to answer the following 
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the probability of a debt crisis? What is a theoretically based empirical measure of a 
"misaligned" exchange rate that increases the probability of a currency/balance of payments 
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Optimal debt and equilibrium exchange rates in a Stochastic Environment: An Overview 
   Jerome L. Stein 
              
The focus of this book
1 is upon real exchange rates, external debt and their 
interaction in an environment where both the return on capital and the real rate of interest 
are stochastic variables. The dynamic interaction between exchange rates and debt occurs 
because an "overvalued" exchange rate leads to a steady rise in the external debt. In turn, 
the accumulation of the debt and the transfer payments on the debt exert downward 
pressure on the exchange rate, which may lead to a currency (balance of payments) crisis. 
Moreover, a significant depreciation of the currency increases the debt burden and 
increases the probability of a debt crisis. 
    This overview chapter explains in general terms the relevance and the 
contributions of this book to economic theory and policy.  The economic theory and 
mathematics developed in chapters two and three derive benchmarks for the optimal debt,  
and for the equilibrium exchange rate in chapter four. These benchmarks are applied in 
chapters five through nine to answer the following questions. 
•  What is a theoretically based empirical measure of an "excess" debt that increases 
the probability of a debt crisis?  
•  What is a theoretically based empirical measure of a "misaligned" exchange rate 
that increases the probability of a currency crisis? 
Several historical examples indicate the significance of these questions. Then we sketch 
how the powerful analytical tools are used to answer these questions in a stochastic 
environment, where the return on capital and real interest rate are not predictable.  
In July 1997, the economies of East Asia became embroiled in one of the worst 
financial crises of the postwar period.  Yet, prior to the crisis, these economies were seen 
as models of economic growth experiencing sustained growth rates that exceeded those 
earlier thought unattainable.  Similarly in 1998, the financial markets, the economics 
profession and the International Monetary Fund viewed Argentina as a model of stability 
and growth. In 2001- 02 the Argentine economy defaulted on its huge debt.  
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Why did the financial markets, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank 
and the bond rating agencies fail to anticipate the crises? In 2004, the International 
Monetary Fund Independent Evaluation Office IEO published a report that reviewed why 
and how, despite the Fund's extensive involvement with Argentina, the Fund was not able 
to help Argentina prevent and better manage the crisis. The primary purpose of the IEO 
evaluation is to draw lessons for the Fund in its future operational work.  
The IEO report stated (pp. 22-23) that there is a general agreement that a 
combination of several external and internal factors contributed to the crisis: (i) weak 
fiscal policy, (ii) rigid exchange rate regime, and (iii) vulnerability to adverse external 
shocks. The IEO could not isolate the relative importance of these factors. "In the 
absence of the underlying vulnerability…the same adverse developments would not have 
had the catastrophic effects that were associated with the crisis, though they may well 
have produced some negative effects."  
The factors underlying vulnerability must be given precise theoretical meaning 
with associated operational measures, to evaluate their explanatory power. The objective 
is to arrive at theoretically justified Early Warning Signals, based upon available 
information. The main reasons for the failures to anticipate balance of payments and debt 
crises were that the theories were based upon deterministic models, which ignored 
uncertainty, or that the theoretical tools were unduly limited in scope. For example, the 
most frequently used method to evaluate whether an exchange rate was misaligned was to 
compare the exchange rate with its Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) value. The PPP 
hypothesis assumes that the "equilibrium" real exchange rate is constant, but it does not 
provide a theory to explain what is the equilibrium real exchange rate. Moreover, this 
hypothesis lacks explanatory power
2. Empirical measures to estimate overvaluation 
compared the real exchange rate to its trend value
3. These eclectic empirical measures 
just add a trend to the PPP but cannot convey information if an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate is a sign of strength or weakness in the balance of payments. 
The most widely used measures of excess debt, which may lead to a debt crisis, 
focus upon two variables: (i) The ratio of debt/GDP that would result if current policies 
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continued into the future. (ii) The trade balance/GDP that would keep the debt/GDP ratio 
equal to its current ratio. It is hypothesized that the higher the number, the more likely is 
it that there would be a debt problem. Empirical researchers concluded that these 
measures lacked explanatory power. 
Since both measures of overvalued exchange rates and excess debt or debt burden 
were inadequate, the implied early warning signals were unreliable. A question that is 
relevant for policy is: what are theoretically based, operational Early Warning Signals 
that have explanatory power? One motive in writing this book is to answer this question. 
Two theoretical tools are developed in this book. The analytical tool to estimate 
and explain the "equilibrium" real exchange rate is the NATREX model, an acronym for 
the natural real exchange rate. This is positive economics. The analytical tool to derive 
the optimal external debt/net worth and expected growth rate in an environment where 
both the productivity of capital and the real interest rate are stochastic is stochastic 
optimal control dynamic programming (SOC/DP). This is normative economics. Both are 
benchmarks of performance. We then explain the interaction between misaligned 
exchange rates and excess debt that increase the probability of crises. In part 7, we sketch 
the eclectic-econometric literature concerning currency and debt crises and compare that 
approach with our theoretically based approach. 
The Central and Eastern European Countries CEEC are planning to join the 
European Monetary Union. These countries must establish the nominal values of their 
currencies upon entering Exchange Rate Mechanism, ERM-II. How should one evaluate 
the appropriateness of their nominal and real exchange rates? In the last ten years, the real 
values of their currencies measured in terms of tradable goods have been appreciating 
relative to the Euro. A correctly chosen exchange rate is a prerequisite for avoiding the 
depressing effects that occurred with the German reunification. An overvalued exchange 
rate hinders real growth, leads to sustained current account deficits and a large external 
debt. These factors could lead to either a debt crisis or a currency crisis. If the CEEC run 
into financial difficulties then, unlike the Eastern part of Germany which has been 
supported by the Western part, their debts will not be forgiven by the other members. 
There is an explicit "no bail- out" clause in the Maastricht treaty (article 104b) that the 
CEEC signed when entering the EU. Moreover, if the exchange rate "disequilibrium" is J. L. Stein, Overview  5
sufficiently great, these countries may be forced to exit from the peg. An undervalued 
exchange rate would generate inflationary pressures that would violate the Maastricht 
criteria for entry into ERM II. We use the NATREX model developed in chapter four to 
evaluate what is an equilibrium exchange rate and to explain the appreciation of the real 
exchange rates of the CEEC: do they reflect strengths or are they Warning Signals of 
currency or debt crises? This question cannot be answered if "misalignment" is measured 
as the deviation of the real exchange rate from its trend. 
Equilibrium exchange rates and sustainable debts are not only relevant to the 
CEEC and to the emerging markets, but also to the entire Euro area and to the United 
States. The real value of the Euro relative to the US dollar has fluctuated drastically since 
its inception. A frequently discussed question is whether the value of the euro has been 
"misaligned", and what is desirable policy? A benchmark, the "equilibrium" real 
exchange rate, is required to answer this question.  
The United States current account has been deeply in deficit in recent years. The 
growing negative net investment position leads to the question: how sustainable is the US 
current account deficit and associated inflow of capital? Alternatively, one should ask: is 
the US debt ratio excessive relative to the derived optimal debt ratio? 
The optimality analysis is based upon state of the art techniques of stochastic 
optimal control/dynamic programming (SOC/DP). The reasons for using these techniques 
are that: (1) Optimization involves inter-temporal decisions. Current decisions not only 
affect current welfare, but they also have consequences for future welfare. (2) The future 
is unpredictable, so that the optimal controls or decisions made at any instant enter as 
feedback functions of the currently observable state.    
The dynamic programming/stochastic optimal control techniques are widely used 
in the mathematical finance literature published in applied mathematics journals
4, but are 
not widely used by economists. The stochastic optimal control techniques that we use to 
derive the optimal debt are quite technical. An attractive feature of our analysis of the 
optimal long term debt and expected endogenous growth is that we are able to show how 
the SOC/DP equations can be understood in terms of a mean variance M-V approach to 
                                                 
4 See American Mathematical Society, Contemporary Mathematics, Mathematics of Finance (2004). 
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portfolio selection. Thereby a relatively intuitive and graphic explanation - based upon 
the M-V techniques known to economists - can be given for the mathematical results.  
An operational measure of the optimal debt/net worth ratio is derived using 
SOC/DP. As the actual debt ratio rises above the optimal, the expected growth rate of 
consumption declines and its variance rises. The actual debt is generated by current 
account deficits, equal to an excess of investment less social saving. Fiscal and monetary 
policies are important determinants of investment less social saving. We believe that if 
the attempt to service the external debt leads to a significant and sustained decline in 
consumption, the country will default - there will be a debt crisis. It follows that as the 
debt ratio rises above the optimal, the probability of a debt crisis increases. The meaning 
of vulnerability is that random events, subsumed under the variance of the growth rate, 
would make the actual growth rate of consumption negative if the debt is serviced.  
Considerable attention is devoted to spelling out the interactions between 
misaligned exchange rates and excessive debt, as these are crucial to the understanding of 
the macroeconomic determinants of crises.  There are several reasons why we need an 
operational concept of an "equilibrium" exchange rate
5. First: we would like to know 
where exchange rates are heading. Second: in the context of fixed exchange rate 
arrangements, such as countries (CEEC) entering into a monetary union or countries that 
have selected hard pegs, it is important to know whether a particular exchange rate is 
sustainable. Will the rate selected be consistent with a "satisfactory" rate of capacity 
utilization and with relative price stability. Third: what factors have produced observed 
changes in real exchange rates? Are they the result of exogenous forces such as the terms 
of trade or are they the results of policies followed. If the latter, how do the controllable 
policies affect the exchange rates?  
Our theme and contributions can be summarized. 
(1) The focus is upon equilibrium real exchange rates, optimal external debt and their 
interaction. (2) Explicit models/transmission mechanisms are specified that explain how 
the dependent variables - the real exchange rate and the external debt - are affected by the 
exogenous and control/policy variables. A "story"/scenario is an integral part of the 
analysis.  
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(3) Key issues are whether the real exchange rate is "misaligned" or whether the debt 
deviates from its optimal value.  
(4) Explicit empirical measures of "misalignment" and "excessive debt" are derived from 
the theory.  
(5) On the basis of the NATREX theory, the equilibrium real exchange rate can be 
written as R[Z(t)], where a rise is an appreciation and Z(t) is a vector of measurable 
exogenous and control/policy real fundamentals that may vary over time. Misalignment 
Φ(t) = R(t) - R[Z(t)] is the difference between the actual real exchange rate R(t) and the 
NATREX.  
(6) The actual exchange rate differs from the NATREX because of speculative, cyclical, 
and other ephemeral influences with zero expectations. Therefore, the real exchange rate 
will converge to a band which contains the NATREX. Specifically, the trends in the 
NATREX explain the trends in the real exchange rate. This tells us which way the 
exchange rate is going. If measured misalignment overvaluation, Φ(t) > 0 is "sufficiently" 
large and sustained and the nominal exchange rate is pegged, a currency crisis is likely to 
occur. Similarly, if there is a significant undervaluation Φ(t) < 0 and a pegged nominal 
exchange rate, then there will be significant inflationary pressure. 
(7) The theoretical literature uses the Maximum Principle of Pontryagin or the 
Intertemporal Budget Constraint (IBC) to derive optimality conditions
6. The Maximum 
Principle is based upon perfect certainty. The trajectory to the steady state is unique, so 
that there is saddle point instability if there are any errors, however slight. The IBC 
literature is based upon certainty equivalence. These measures are inappropriate because 
we live in a world of uncertainty, the future is unpredictable and agents are risk averse. It 
is inappropriate to use "certainty equivalence". The IBC is unknowable, not operational 
and not enforceable. Instead, the techniques of stochastic optimal control/dynamic 
programming SOC/DP are used in this book to derive "inter-temporal optimization". We 
derive the optimal external debt/net worth, capital/net worth, consumption/net worth and 
the optimal endogenous expected growth rate in a stochastic environment.  
(8) The optimal debt/net worth f* or capital/net worth, derived from the SOC/DP analysis  
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perfect knowledge and certainty, and showed that dynamic programming is a very much better method to 
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is measurable for any arbitrary risk aversion. An excessive debt Ψt = ft - f*t is the 
deviation of the actual debt ratio ft from f*t the optimal ratio.  
(9) The greater is the measured excessive debt Ψt the lower is the expected growth rate of 
consumption and the higher is its variance. It is therefore the more likely is it that random 
external shocks will lead to a debt default.  
(10) The two types of crises are interrelated. A currency depreciation increases the real 
external debt burden, which raises the probability of a debt crisis. A debt burden 
adversely affects the current account and capital flows, which exert pressure on the 
exchange rate. We give precision to the concept of "vulnerability" to adverse 
developments on the basis of two measures. 
Excess debt     Ψt = ft - f*t  > 0     ⇒ probability of debt crisis increases 
Misalignment   Φt = Rt - R[Zt] > 0 ⇒ probability of currency crisis increases;  
Interaction   Probability of currency crisis Ù Probability of debt crisis 
A "guided tour" of our contributions starts with the analyses of both optimal 
short-term (part 2) and long-term external debt (part 3). A measure of excess debt Ψt is 
derived in each case. Empirical examples of excess debt and Early Warning Signals of a 
debt crisis derived from the theoretical analyses are given (part 4) for emerging markets 
and Latin America. The next part of the "guided tour" concerns the equilibrium exchange 
rates, based upon the NATREX model (part 5). A measure of misalignment is derived 
based upon this model. The relation between the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 
hypothesis and the NATREX is explained. An example is provided showing how the 
NATREX model explains the medium to longer run movements in the real exchange rate 
of the Dollar-Synthetic Euro (part 6). Finally, the interaction between misaligned 
exchange rates Φ and excessive debt Ψ is shown (part 7) for the 1997-98 crisis in 
Thailand. This example illustrates the contribution of our analysis, relative to that found 
in the eclectic-econometric literature, in providing Early Warning Signals of balance of 
currency and debt crises.  
 
1. Optimal Debt Models 
 A major source of the private capital flow is direct investment, which is long-
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private flow is bank loans, which is short-term investment. Countries have both types of 
debt, and the optimal amounts differ according to the type. The inter-temporal 
optimization problem arises because the debt occurred to finance consumption and 
investment at one time affects the consumption possibilities at a later date. This choice is 
seen in equations (1) and (2).     
In the case of short-term investment if the borrowing is at time t then it must be 
repaid with interest at later date s = t + ∆t .  In the case of long-term investment, the debt 
does not have to be repaid at any terminal date, but must be serviced regularly. Equation 
(1) describes the change in the debt dLt. External debt Lt. rises because consumption   
plus investment 
t C
t I  plus the debt service rL exceeds Y  the GDP.  Alternatively, the 
change in the debt is 
tt t
( ) tt I Sd t − , investment It less saving St = Yt - rtLt - Ct over the period 
of length dt.   
(1)  dLt = (It - St)dt = (Ct + It + rtLt - Yt)dt = current account deficit 
Fiscal and monetary policies are important determinants of investment and social 
saving by the private plus public sectors. In the Latin American countries the debt has 
risen due to high consumption and/or low social saving by the public plus the private 
sectors.  In the Asian countries industrial policy stimulated private investment  The 
excess of  investment less saving leads to a capital inflow and an increase in the external 
foreign currency denominated debt. 
The external debt has to be serviced and that would clearly affect future 
consumption.  We can see this by writing consumption at some later time s = t+dt, in 
equation (2) below
7. Consumption is equal to the GNP, which is equal to the GDP less 
the debt service Ys - rsLs, less investment Is plus new borrowing dLs. The new borrowing 
is the net capital inflow in the form of either direct investment, portfolio investment or 
short term bank flows.  
(2) Cs ds = (Ys - rsLs - Is )ds +  dLs 
Three elements must be specified to solve the inter-temporal optimization 
problem. Different models involve different specifications of these three elements.  
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(i) The constraints and controls/policy decisions.  
(ii) The dynamic stochastic process 
(ii) The optimality criterion  
In chapter two, the debt is modeled as short-term corresponding to bank loans. In 
the model discussed in chapter three, the debt is long term, which would correspond to 
direct investment or long-term portfolio investment. The major theoretical difference 
concerns the constraints, so that the mathematical analysis is very different in each case. 
They must be modeled differently, and one case cannot be modeled as a special case of 
the other, for the following reason. 
In the short-term debt model sketched in part 2 below, debt is incurred in period t 
=1 which has a maturity at period t =2. It is a repeating two period model. There are 
several constraints. The first is that at maturity, the debt must be repaid with interest. The 
second is that the capital at the beginning of period t =3 must be the same as it was at the 
beginning of t =1, so the process is repeated. The third is that consumption in period t =2, 
when the debt is repaid, must exceed a certain minimum - regardless of the state of 
nature. This is a "no bankruptcy" constraint. The argument is that, if the attempt to 
service the debt would reduce consumption below the minimum - which we arbitrarily set 
at zero - then the country would default. Faced with a choice: (a) repay debt and 
drastically reduce the standard of living, or (b) default but do not drastically reduce the 
standard of living, the economy would select the second option. The controls/policies are 
the consumption, investment and resulting debt in period t =1, subject to the constraints. 
In the long-term model of chapter three, sketched in part 3 below, there is no 
maturity to the debt but it must always be serviced. It is an infinite horizon model in 
continuous time. The controls - debt, capital and consumption - are constantly adjusted to 
keep these control/policy variables at their derived optimum levels. The constraint is that 
consumption always be positive, regardless of the state of nature. This inter-temporal 
optimization involves the use of dynamic programming. 
In both cases, a debt crisis is produced when the actual debt significantly exceeds 
the constrained optimal debt. The actual debt is generated by saving and investment 
decisions by the private and public sectors, which may be far from optimal. The economy J. L. Stein, Overview  11
is more vulnerable to external shocks when the actual debt significantly exceeds the 
constrained optimal debt. 
The second specification concerns the stochastic process. Two stochastic 
variables - real GDP and real interest rate - will affect consumption at the later date. They 
are written in bold letters in equation (2). Each one is highly variable. If bad shocks 
reduce the GDP and raise real interest rates, and investment falls to a minimum level then 
consumption in equation (2) may have to be reduced - unless there is new borrowing to 
offset the decline.  We model the two sources of uncertainty that ultimately affect 
consumption. The first source of uncertainty is the ratio of GDP per unit of capital Yt/Kt 
and the second source is the real rate of interest rt.   
The output/capital ratio Yt/Kt = bt  has a deterministic component b, which is the 
mean return on capital, and a stochastic component with a zero mean and a significantly 
positive variance. The deterministic component b corresponds to the slope of a regression 
of the growth of GDP on the ratio of investment/GDP, and the stochastic part 
corresponds to the standard error of estimate. This stochastic part contains the "Solow 
residual", variations in the rate of capacity utilization resulting from fiscal and monetary 
policies, variations in the terms of trade and the composition and quality of the 
investments. 
The second source of uncertainty concerns the real interest rate rt required to 
service the external debt  .  For countries other than the US - such as emerging market 
countries - the real interest rate in terms of consumer goods r  has three components. The 
first is the interest rate on US Treasury long-term debt. The second is the premium on 
dollar denominated debt charged to sovereign borrowers. The third is the anticipated 
exchange rate depreciation of the currency. A currency depreciation increases the amount 
of consumer goods that must be sacrificed to service/repay the foreign currency 
denominated debt. The equation for the real interest rate contains two terms: the first term 
is deterministic with a mean real rate of interest r and the second term is stochastic with a 
positive variance.  
t L
t
The expectations of the stochastic terms are equal to zero, but the productivity of 
capital and real rate of interest may be correlated.  In developed countries such as the 
United States and Europe, the correlation is generally positive. In periods of rapid J. L. Stein, Overview  12
growth, there is a rise in investment demand and demand for money; and interest rates 
rise. When there are financial crises, whether in the United States during the Great 
Depression or during financial crises in Asia or Latin America, the growth of GDP and 
real interest rate are negatively correlated, for the following reason. A decline in GDP 
may occur because of a decline in the terms of trade and/or the anticipated return on 
investment turns out to be an illusion and the asset bubble collapses. The stochastic term 
in the productivity of capital equation is negative.  Since firms borrow primarily from the 
banks to finance real investment and the banks in turn primarily finance their loans by 
borrowing US dollars in the international capital market, a domino effect is created in the 
event of a financial panic.  When debtors are unable to repay their loans to the banks, the 
banks in turn are unable to repay their loans to international creditors.  Financial panic 
leads to a short term capital flight.  The government may try to stem the outflow by using 
the dollar reserves, but that is only a stopgap measure.  Sooner or later the monetary 
authorities will raise interest rates and, when that fails to stem the outflow, the currency 
will depreciate.  The depreciation of the currency implies that the real rate of interest to 
repay a debt denominated in foreign currency rises. In that event, the stochastic term in 
the real interest rate equation is positive.  The situation is exacerbated when banks also 
denominate their loans to the domestic firms in US dollars. Firms would find it very 
difficult to service debts denominated in foreign currency because they are faced with 
both a rising nominal rate of interest and a depreciating currency. A negative correlation 
between the productivity of capital bt and the real rate of interest rt makes an external 
debt very risky. 
Faced with these sources of uncertainty, how then should a country select its 
optimal debt and level of consumption? The third specification concerns the optimality 
criterion. One criterion is that the controls are selected to maximize the expectation of the 
discounted value of a concave utility of consumption over the appropriate horizon. A 
second criterion is that the debt and capital are selected to maximize the expected value 
of the growth rate of consumption over a horizon, subject to the constraint that the ratio 
of consumption/net worth is a positive constant. A third criterion is a very conservative 
one. The controls are selected to maximize the minimum expected value of the utility of J. L. Stein, Overview  13
consumption
8. Only the first two criteria are used in this book. 
 
2. Short-debt model in Discrete Time Finite Horizon 
For many countries, short-term capital flows are important in financing 
investment less saving and have been associated with crises, such as in Southeast Asia 
1997-98. In this part, we sketch the derivation of the optimal investment, consumption 
and debt in the short-term capital movements model (STCM), which is the subject of 
chapter two. Explicit equations for excess debt Ψt and Early Warning Signals of a debt 
crisis are stated. In part 4, we provide specific examples of how this analysis can explain 
the default risk in emerging market countries and Latin America. Detailed empirical 
application of the STCM is the subject of chapter five. 
The model assumes two repeating discrete time periods. In period one, the 
country has a stock of capital K1 and a Gross Domestic Product Y1. The controls are 
consumption C1 and investment I1. If consumption plus investment is greater than the 
GDP, the country incurs an external debt L1 to finance the difference. If consumption 
plus investment is less than the GDP the country is an international creditor, and the debt 
L1 is negative. The debt, or net foreign assets, bears a known real rate of interest
9. At the 
second period, the debt plus interest must be repaid. We consider a repeating two period 
model, so that the capital at the beginning of period three must be the same as it was at 
the beginning of period one. This constraint means that the sum of investment over the 
two periods must be zero. 
The productivity of capital Yt/Kt = bt is a stochastic variable. When the investment 
decision I1 is made in period one, the productivity of capital in period two b2 = Y2/K2 is 
unknown. Capital in period two is the capital at the beginning of period one plus the 
investment made in period one. Two possibilities are considered. Either the productivity 
of capital in period two b
+ exceeds the interest rate r, with probability 1 > p > 0, or the 
productivity of capital b
- is less than the rate of interest with probability (1-p).  
The debt in period one L1 finances investment I less saving S. The stochastic 
variable b2 is written in bold letters. Consumption in period two C2 is equal to the GDP in 
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period two Y2 = b2K2 = b2 (K1+ I1) less the repayment of the debt plus interest (1+r)L1 
plus the disinvestment to make capital at the beginning of period three equal to the initial 
capital K1. Equation (3) describes consumption C2 in period two. Since the return on 
capital can assume two values: b
+ > r in the good case, and b
- < r in the bad case, 
consumption in period two can assume either C2
+ in the good case or C2
- in the bad case.  
(3) C2 = b2K1 + [(1+r)(b1K1 – C1)] + (b2 – r)I1. 
There are three components to consumption in period two, equation (3). If there is 
neither saving (S1 = b1K1 - C1) nor investment in period one – if consumption is equal to 
GDP in the first period – then consumption in period two would just be the GDP in 
period two Y2 = b2K1.  
If there is saving but no investment in period one, then consumption in period two 
is the sum of the first two terms. The saving is invested abroad at the known rate of 
interest, and permits the economy to consume [(1+r)(b1K1 – C1)]. This term is not 
stochastic. 
If there is investment in period one, then the additional consumption available in 
period two is the stochastic net return times the investment- the third term  (b2 – r)I1.  
If the bad state of nature occurs b2 = b2
- < r then the burden of the debt resulting 
from (b
- - r)I1 could depress consumption C2 to an intolerable level. In that case, the 
country would default rather than accept the required reduced standard of living.  
The constrained optimization decision is to select the controls: consumption C1 > 
0 and investment I1 > 0 during period one to maximize the expectation over the stochastic 
variable b2 of the discounted value of utility over the two periods. We assume a HARA 
utility function, U(C) = (1/γ)C
γ ,
 with positive risk aversion, (1-γ) > 0. A special case that 
we use frequently is when γ = 0, so that the utility function is logarithmic U(C) = log C. 
The great advantage of using the HARA function, particularly in the long-term model in 
chapter three is that one can solve for the optimal controls analytically. Otherwise, the 
optimal controls are solved numerically by using a computer. 
An important constraint is that there should be no default. This means that 
consumption in period two, in the bad case, should exceed a minimum tolerable level C2
- 
> Cmin > 0.  J. L. Stein, Overview  15
The solution of the STCM models is the subject of chapter two. The conclusions 
are described in figure 1-1 below for the optimal debt/capital f = L1/K1. We concentrate 




Figure 1-1. Optimal debt/capital f= L1/K1  is curve ABDEF.   
Expected net return x = E(b – r) = [pb
+ + (1-p)b
- ] – r. Along ABD the country is a 
creditor. Along DEF the country is a debtor. If debt/capital exceeds f-max, the probability 
of default is (1-p)>0. 
 
Optimal saving/capital is a constant independent of the expected net return x = 
E(b – r). Optimal investment/capital is zero for expected net return x < a in figure 1. Risk 
premium a is related to the ratio of the possible loss from investment in capital divided by  
the return if all wealth were invested abroad at the safe return. This means that, for x < a, 
the country will be a creditor and will invest all of its saving abroad earning the safe rate 
of return r > 0. The debt/capital will be f-min  < 0, where the country is a creditor.  J. L. Stein, Overview  16
When the expected net return rises above a, investment will be positive, thereby 
reducing the capital outflow. When the expected net return x = D, investment will equal 
saving and the country will neither be a creditor or a debtor. When x > D, then 
investment will exceed saving. There will be a short-term capital inflow and a positive 
optimal ratio of f = debt /capital > 0. The constraint that there be no default means that 
there is a maximal debt, f-max, such that in the event of a bad state of nature b2 = b
-, the 
level of consumption would exceed Cmin.  
Summary: 
Curve ABDEF is the constrained optimal ratio debt/capital, in the short-term 
capital flow model. Expected utility is maximized along this curve. Insofar as the debt 
deviates from the curve, expected utility is reduced. The optimal debt is a benchmark of 
performance. Debt crises result because the actual debt deviates from the optimal debt. If 
the debt exceeds f-max, due to non-optimal behavior of the public and private sectors 
then: with probability (1-p) > 0 consumption will be less than Cmin and there will be a 
default. Alternatively, the likelihood of default rises continuously as the utility of 
consumption C2 declines. In part 4 below, examples of Warning Signal are given for 
several emerging market countries. 
        
3. Dynamic Programming Optimization in long-term debt models 
For many countries the main obligations to foreigners arise from direct 
investment and portfolio investment. These forms of "debt" have no maturity date, but 
must be serviced regularly with interest and dividend payments. The modeling of optimal 
long-term debt in continuous time over an infinite horizon is very different from the 
modeling of short-term debt in discrete time described in part 2 above. The short-term 
debt model has a constraint that principal plus interest must be repaid at maturity. This is 
a model of repeating cycles of debt and repayment. If the debt exceeds debt-max due to 
non-optimal behavior of the public and private sectors, and the "bad" state of nature 
occurs, it may be impossible to satisfy this constraint with a positive consumption even if 
investment falls to the minimum. Then bankruptcy occurs. In the long-term debt model, 
there is no maturity date. Bankruptcy can only occur if net worth, to be defined below, is 
negative. The optimal controls will prevent that from occurring. J. L. Stein, Overview  17
Consumption and the growth of the debt are described by equations (1) and (2) 
above. The two sources of uncertainty are the productivity of capital and the real interest 
rate, which may be correlated. In section 3.1 the optimality criteria are discussed. In 
section 3.2 we describe two models with alternative stochastic processes concerning the 
sources of uncertainty: the Prototype Model and the Ergodic Mean Reversion Model. In 
section 3.3, we indicate why the literature that uses the "inter-temporal budget constraint" 
(IBC) is inadequate. Section (3.4) explains why and how we use the Dynamic 
Programming analysis. The conclusions concerning the optimal debt/net worth ratio, 
capital/net worth ratio and consumption/net worth are described in section (3.5). In part 4 
we give an example of the implications of the DP analysis by providing Early Warning 
Signal of Argentine crisis of 2000-2001. In part 7, we give an example of the interaction 
of an overvalued currency and excess debt in producing the crisis in Thailand 1997-98. 
 
3.1 Optimality Criteria 
Several reasonable optimality criteria are used in the mathematical finance 
literature. Usually the criterion is to select the control/decision variables, consumption, 
debt or capital subject to constraints, to maximize the expectation (E) of the discounted 
value of a concave utility of consumption U(Ct) over an  horizon (0,T), where T may be 
infinite or finite. These are equations (4a) or (4b). In the infinite horizon case, the 
discount rate is δ > 0.The expectation is taken over the stochastic variables: the 
productivity of capital and real rate of interest.  
Analytic solutions of the dynamic programming equation can be obtained if the 
utility function is HARA
10 described in equations (4a) and (4b). The coefficient of risk 
aversion is (1-γ) > 0. The lower is γ, the greater is the risk aversion. Negative and zero 
values of γ imply considerable aversion to risk. In the case where γ < 0, the utility of a 
zero consumption is minus infinity. When γ = 0, the utility function is logarithmic.  
 
(4a) J1 = E ∫ 
T  Ct
γ/γ e
-δt dt       γ ≠ 0      T > t > 0 
(4b) J2 = E ∫ 
T  ln Ct e
-δt dt      γ = 0      T > t > 0 
                                                 
10 That is the reason that Merton used HARA. Otherwise, the DP equation must be solved numerically 
using a computer. J. L. Stein, Overview  18
Two constraints are imposed. (A) Consumption is always positive. (B) Net worth 
must always be positive. Define net worth Xt > 0 as "capital" less debt. A negative debt is 
a financial asset. Unless constraint (B) is imposed, Ponzi schemes are possible: borrow to 
finance consumption and borrow more to service the debt. In that case, capital does not 
grow. As the debt continues to grow exponentially, net worth will be driven to negative 
values. The constraint that net worth is always positive precludes Ponzi schemes. 
There are two subjective variables, the discount rate and risk aversion. The 
discount rate is just another way of specifying the length of the horizon. A high discount 
rate places the emphasis upon what occurs in the near future, and essentially disregards 
the far future. A discount rate δ > 0 is necessary to derive a finite optimum over an 
infinite horizon if γ > 0, whereas if γ < 0, then a discount rate is not necessary to derive a 
finite optimum over an infinite horizon.  
Whenever the utility function is logarithmic, the optimal ratio of consumption/net 
worth equals the "discount rate". Consumption is social consumption, government plus 
private consumption expenditure. Low taxes and high government expenditures raise 
social consumption. Since the discount rate is arbitrary, this quantity can rationalize any 
social consumption policy. If populist policies lead to a high rate of social 
consumption/GDP, it can be "rationalized" as optimal policy with a high discount rate. 
Weight the present highly relative to the future. If the dictator, a Chairman Mao, follows 
policies that depress social consumption, it can be "rationalized" as optimal policy with a 
low discount rate. Weight the future highly relative to the present.  
Criterion J3 in equation (5) does not involve the arbitrary discount rate. Quantity 
J3 is the expected growth rate of net worth over a horizon of length T, given any constant 
ratio c of consumption to net worth, Ct/Xt = c > 0. Since consumption is a constant 
fraction of net worth the maximization of J3 is the same as the maximization of the 
growth rate of consumption from an arbitrary initial level. 
(5) J3 = (1/T)E [ln XT/X | Ct/Xt = c > 0 ] 
 = (1/T)E [ln Ct/C| Ct/Xt  = c > 0],    X = X(0), C = C(0) 
Criteria J1 and J2 allow us to solve for both the optimum debt/net worth ratio, 
capital/net worth and the optimum consumption/net worth, whereas criterion J3 only 
allows us to solve for the optimal debt/net worth and capital/net worth. We explain in J. L. Stein, Overview  19
chapter three that the same optimal ratios of debt/net worth and capital/net worth are 
obtained whether we use criterion J2 or J3.  
There is another criterion, which reflects extreme aversion to risk. The 
consumption in any period depends upon both the controls/decision variables  - 
consumption, capital or debt - and the stochastic productivity of capital. Suppose that 
there is a finite set of productivities of capital and a corresponding likelihood function. 
The Max-min criterion of optimality is to select the controls that maximize the minimum 
expected values of consumption for very large values of risk aversion. Fleming (2005) 
analyzes this very conservative case. 
 
3.2 Stochastic Processes      
The sources of uncertainty are modeled as stochastic processes in continuous 
time. The prototype model assumes that both the productivity of capital bt and the world 
real rate of interest rt can be described by statistical functions such as Brownian motion
11 
with drift. The mean return on investment is b, but there is no mean reversion. The 
change in the return to investment from one "period" to the next is purely random with a 
zero expectation, Brownian motion. Similarly, there is a world real rate of interest at 
which the country can borrow or lend. The mean is r, but there is no mean reversion. The 
change in the real rate of interest from one "period" to the next is just the Brownian 
motion with drift. 
An alternative stochastic process is that the productivity of capital is still 
Brownian Motion with drift but that the world real interest rate, dependent upon a large 
vector of factors, is described by Ergodic Mean Reversion. This stochastic process is 
described by the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck equation, which states that the change in the real 
rate of interest from one "period" to the next is not completely random. One part is a 
reversion to the mean, and the second part is Brownian motion. The net result is that the 
real rate of interest is normally distributed and converges to a distribution whose mean is 
r with a positive variance. The stochastic processes in the two models are summarized. 
 
                                                 
11 A Brownian motion process has independent increments that are normally distributed. The expectation is 
zero and the variance is directly related to the length of the period. J. L. Stein, Overview  20
Return on investment bt    real interest rate rt 
Prototype model    Brownian motion with drift  Brownian motion with drift 
Ergodic mean reversion  Brownian motion with drift   Ornstein-Uhlenbeck 
 
Mathematically, it is easy to reverse which variable is described by Brownian motion 
with drift, and which is described by Ergodic Mean Reversion. In any empirical 
application to determine the optimal debt ratio, we first examine what are the appropriate 
stochastic processes for each variable: the return on investment and the real rate of 
interest. In chapter three, we compare the optimal debt ratio in each of the two models: 
Prototype and Ergodic Mean Reversion. 
3.3  Inter-temporal Optimization: Stochastic Optimal Control, Dynamic Programming 
 The standard approach in the economics literature concerning inter-temporal 
optimization
12 is to maximize the expectation of the discounted value of the utility of 
consumption subject to an "Inter-temporal Budget Constraint" IBC.  The inter-temporal 
case is treated as the analogue of the standard deterministic case of consumer choice. In 
the timeless case, the consumer has a utility function over a vector of goods, leisure and 
services whose prices are given and the consumer has a fixed amount of resources, 
money and time. The constraint is that the choice is restricted to the amount of resources 
available. The budget constraint is known with certainty since prices and resources 
available are known when the choice is made. The IBC is of an entirely different nature. 
The object of an "inter-temporal budget constraint" is to prevent a "free lunch", or engage 
in a Ponzi scheme where debts are never repaid. The IBC imposed is a terminal 
condition. At finite date T> 0 the debts are cleared, debt LT = 0. The IBC is inappropriate 
in a stochastic environment/a world of uncertainty. Instead, one must use the techniques 
of stochastic optimal control/dynamic programming. 
From equation (1), the debt LT at time T is the initial debt L(0) plus the sum of the 
excess of expenditures for consumption Ct plus investment It plus interest on the debt rtLt 
less Gross Domestic Product Yt. The IBC is that the debt is paid off at the terminal date. 
The condition that LT = 0 implies the IBC, the sum of absorption (Ct + It) is equal to the 
sum of the Gross National Product (Yt - rtLt). 
                                                 
12 A discussion of this literature is in Gandolfo and Turnovsky. J. L. Stein, Overview  21
The stochastic variables (in bold letters) are Yt the real GDP and rt the real 
interest rate. Given the uncertainty concerning the productivity of capital and real interest 
rate, the future is unpredictable.  At any time s < T when the debt is Ls, how can anyone 
know if any country will/will not be, violating the IBC?   
The IBC is unknowable, unenforceable and is a non-operational concept. If a 
country has a debt L(0) at the present, how can one know if the IBC will be satisfied even 
if a given policy - a sequence of investment and consumption - is followed? The reason is 
that Yt, rt the real GDP and interest rate are stochastic variables with Brownian Motion 
components. For example, when the price of oil (during the oil crises periods) was high 
the oil producing countries and the oil importing countries expected it to continue. In the 
former huge investment and consumption projects were undertaken in the expectation 
that the real GDP would remain high. In the oil consuming countries, costly energy 
saving policies were imposed. These anticipations did not materialize and the oil 
producing countries were saddled with large debts.  
This profound deficiency of the IBC approach led Fleming and Stein
13 to use 
dynamic programming DP approach
14, which features prominently in this book. 
 
3.4 The Dynamic Programming DP/Stochastic Optimal Control Approach SOC
15 
 
Our underlying models are Markov diffusion processes where the future evolution 
of the system depends upon the present state and not at all upon the paths leading up to 
the present state. For example, the change in the debt dLt in equation (1) depends upon 
the current values of the gross domestic product Yt, consumption, investment, real 
interest rate rt and debt Lt, and not upon what factors in the past produced the current debt 
or gross domestic product.  
The system is stochastic, unpredictable. Even if one specified the 
controls/decisions
16 from the present to any future date, the future is unpredictable 
                                                 
13 Fleming and Stein (2004), Fleming (2004) and Stein (2004). 
14  The seminal work was by Bellman The DP approach is generally used in the mathematical finance literature, 
starting from the work of Robert Merton. 
15 This section is an intuitive discussion of chapter three, which is based upon techniques used in the 
mathematical finance literature.  
16 Controls and decisions are used interchangeably. J. L. Stein, Overview  22
because there are many paths that the system can take due to the stochastic processes 
describing the real GDP and the real interest rate. At each instant of time the 
"controller/decision maker" knows the state of the system, and only has information up to 
the present. Since, the controller cannot anticipate the future, the DP approach involves a 
multi-stage decision process. The principle of optimality of DP is that: whatever the 
initial state and the initial decisions are, the remaining decisions must constitute an 
optimal policy with regard to the state resulting from the first decision. In a stochastic 
system, the optimal controls selected at any time depend upon the current information 
available and enter as feedback functions of the currently observable state. This is very 
different from the IBC approach. 
The state variable in the stochastic systems discussed in this book is net worth Xt 
defined as "capital" Kt less debt Lt. The change in capital is investment over the period, 
and the change in the debt is equation (1). The latter involves the stochastic variables, the 
productivity of capital and the real rate of interest.  
The DP solutions of the optimization of the expected discounted value of utility 
(J1, J2 in equations 4a, 4b) given the dynamical system concerning net worth involve the 
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation discussed in chapter three. The DP analysis of 
inter-temporal optimization is quite technical, however the optimal debt/net worth f in the 
HJB equation can be explained in terms of the well known Tobin Mean-Variance M-V 
model. 
The optimal debt/net worth f in the HJB equation is chosen to maximize W in 
equation (6).  
(6) W = maxf [Mean - (risk aversion) Risk]. 
The Mean term M(f,c) is a linear function of the debt ratio and the consumption 
ratio. It is the percentage change in net worth
17 if there were no uncertainty. Risk is R(f) 
and (1-γ) is risk aversion. The risk term concerns the variance of the percent change in 
net worth. In the logarithmic cases (γ = 0), risk aversion is unity. Term R(f) contains the 
variances of the productivity of capital, the interest rate and their correlation. Stochastic 
term R(f) is a quadratic function of the debt ratio. A unique optimal ratio of debt/net 
worth is derived that maximizes W, which can be interpreted as M-V expected utility. A 
                                                 
17 This is dX/X but it is not the growth rate, which is the percentage change per unit of time. J. L. Stein, Overview  23
graphical explanation of equation (6) presented in chapter three provides the intuition 
behind the DP results.  
 
3.5 Implications of the DP solution of the long-term capital model 
The Stochastic Optimal Control/Dynamic Programming analysis is used to derive 
the inter-temporal optimal conditions. The debt/net worth ratio ft = Lt/Xt = f* that 
maximizes performance criterion J1, equation (4a) is the one that maximizes equation W 
in (6). The derived optimal debt in equation (7) is a benchmark measure of performance 
in a stochastic environment. Net worth is capital less debt. Therefore, the optimal ratio k* 
of capital/net worth is k* = f* + 1. In the logarithmic case J2 equation (4b) where risk 
aversion (1-γ) = 1, the optimum debt/net worth is:  
(7)  f* = (b-r)/ σ
2  + f(0),  σ
2 = var (bt  - rt). 
Several crucial variables are in this equation. First, variable b is the mean 
productivity of capital or return on investment, r is mean real interest rate. In the 
logarithmic cases J2 and J3 risk aversion (1 -γ ) = 1. Variable σ
2 is the variance of the 
quantity (bt - rt), the current productivity of capital less the current interest rate, so that it 
also contains a covariance term. The intercept f(0) is the optimal ratio of debt/net worth 
that minimizes risk. When the correlation coefficient between the growth rate and interest 
rate is less than  / yr σ σ , the intercept f(0) is negative. The optimum debt ratio f* in the 
Prototype model is equation (7), which is our benchmark of performance. Equation (7) is 
graphed in Figure 1-2 as line U-S.  The debt ratio f = L/X is plotted on the ordinate and 
the risk adjusted mean net rate of return z = (b-r)/σ
2 is plotted on the abscissa                                    J. L. Stein, Overview  24
  
 
Figure 1-2. Optimal Ratio Debt/Net Worth f* is line U-S, when risk aversion is unity. In 
the Prototype model, the risk adjusted net return z = (b-r)/σ
2 ,  σ
2 = var (bt - r t). In the 
Ergodic Mean Reversion model the adjusted net return z = (b - rt)/var bt. Variance bt and 
var yt are used interchangeably, since b = Y/K. Optimal capital/net worth k* = 1 + f*. 
              
                    Summary and implications of the DP analysis
18 
(i) Consider two countries, which differ greatly in terms of wealth and income. 
There is no necessary relation between per capital wealth and the risk adjusted mean net 
return z = (b-r)/σ
2.  In rich/developed country I, the risk adjusted mean net return z = z1 
and in poor/emerging market country II the risk adjusted mean net return z = z2. In the 
situation described in figure 1-2, it is optimal that the poor country should be a creditor 
of the rich country because the mean return per unit of risk z = (b-r)/σ
2is higher in the 
rich country. Either the mean net return (b-r) is higher or the risk σ 
2is lower in rich 
country I than in poor country II. 
                                                 
18 These propositions refer to the case where risk aversion (1-γ) is unity, the logarithmic case. J. L. Stein, Overview  25
(ii) The expected growth of net worth is maximal, for any consumption ratio, 
when the debt/net worth ratio
19 is optimal at f*. As the debt ratio rises above the line U-S 
which describes the optimum f*, the expected growth rate declines, and the risk - the 
variance of the growth rate - increases.  
(iii) Objective measures of vulnerability to external shocks are implied by the 
analysis. Vulnerability is taken as a situation where, if the debt is to be serviced, 
consumption must be reduced when there are external shocks. Say that consumption is a 
constant proportion of net worth. This proportion may or may not be "optimal". As the 
actual debt ratio rises above the optimum, say because non-optimal policies are 
undertaken by the public sector, the expected growth rates of net worth and consumption 
decline and their variances rise. Therefore, the vulnerability to shocks increases 
continuously as f rises relative to f*. The probability of a decline in consumption rises 
and the probability of a debt crisis increases continuously as the debt ratio exceeds the 
optimum.  
(iv) The level of the ratio
20 of debt/GDP per se is not a relevant variable in 
producing a crisis. Instead it is the excess of the actual debt ratio over the optimal f* that 
raises the probability of a crisis. A Warning Signal Ψt = (ft - f*), based upon available 
information, is that the debt ratio is rising above line U-S in figure 1-2.  When the mean 
net return per unit of risk z = (b-r)/σ
2 is falling, the optimal debt ratio should be declining. 
If, however, the debt/GDP ratio is rising because non-optimal policies are followed, it is 
more probable that the debt ratio lies in the region above the curve US. 
In the Ergodic Mean Reversion (EMR) model, suppose that the aim is to 
maximize the expected growth rate of consumption, given an arbitrary ratio of 
consumption/net worth. This is the maximization of J3 in equation (5). The ratio of the 
optimal debt/net worth ratio f** is (7a), when the disturbances to the productivity of 
capital and interest rate are independent, ρ = 0. 
(7a) f** = (b - rt)/σy
2 - 1.      EMR 
                                                 
19 The ratio of capital/net worth  is equal to 1 plus the debt ratio. 
20 The ratio of h = debt/GDP is positively related to the ratio f* = debt/net worth. The equation is:  
h = (1/b)f/(1+f), where b is the mean productivity of investment. Therefore, one can speak of the ratios f 
and h interchangeably  J. L. Stein, Overview  26
The main difference between the optimal debt ratio in (7a) for the EMR and 
equation (7) for the Prototype Model is that: in the Prototype model equation (7), the risk 
adjusted return z is the mean net return (b-r) divided by the total variance of the return σ
2 
= var (bt - r t). In the Ergodic Mean Reversion model, the adjusted return z = zt is the 
mean return on capital less the current rate of interest (b - rt) divided by the variance σb
2 
= σy
2 of the return on capital. Therefore, figure 1-2 can be used to describe the optimal 
debt ratio in either model; however, the risk adjusted return must be suitably interpreted. 
 
4. Examples of Early Warning Signals EWS of Debt Crises 
The operational conclusions from the two models are used to derive EWS of debt 
crises. They occur primarily because the government policies lead to non-optimal saving 
and investment. In section 4.1 we give examples based upon panel data
21 of default risk 
in emerging market countries during the period 1979-2001. Section 4.2 contrasts Mexico 
that defaulted with Tunisia that did not. In section 4.3, the example is Argentina, which 
went from the darling of the creditors to the world's greatest defaulter. The main 
conclusion from the models developed in parts 2 and 3 are as follows. 
•  The debt/GDP ratio per se is not the relevant variable.  
•  The optimal debt ratio is described by the curve A-B-D-E-F in figure 1-1 for the 
short-term debt model, and by      line U-S in figure 1-2 in the long-term debt 
model. 
•  The greater is the deviation of the actual debt from the optimal debt, the greater is 
the probability of default in the event of "bad" external shocks. In the short-term 
debt model figure 1-1, if the debt exceeds debt-max, then the default is likely with 
probability (1-p). 
•  The optimal debt/net worth ratio f* in the long-term debt model has the form: ft* 
= azt + f(0), where zt is the risk adjusted net return (b-r)/σ
2  , f(0) is a constant and 
a is the reciprocal of risk aversion.  
•  The EWS is that the actual debt ratio ft is deviating from the optimal f*. 
                                                 
21 These examples are taken from chapter five J. L. Stein, Overview  27
 
4.1. Emerging Markets: panel data  
Emerging market countries during the period 1979-2001 were divided into two 
groups: those that defaulted/renegotiated their debts with either official or private 
creditors
22 and those that did not. The relation between the debt/GDP ratio and the 
expected net return did not accord with the optimal ratio in figures 1-1 or 1-2 in either set 
of countries examined (renegotiate/no-default). The main difference between the two 
groups concerned the excess debt, ω = (f - fmax),  the deviation between the actual 
debt/GDP ratio from the maximal debt/GDP ratio. When there is an excess debt, the 
economy is vulnerable. In the event of a bad shock, the level of consumption would fall 
below the minimum and would default. The bad shock will occur with probability (1-p). 
In the empirical applications of the short-term capital model to emerging markets, 
a Warning Signal  ω = (f - fmax)  is equation (8). It is a "flashing red" Warning Signal of a 
debt crisis. The actual debt ratio is ft, the ratio of investment/GDP is j, the mean return on 
investment is b1, the return on investment in the bad case is b
-
2 and the rate of interest is r. 
(8) ωt = ft - fmax = ft - [(b
-
2 / b1) + (1 + b
-
2) j](1+r). 
 Default is often a political decision, where international organizations and foreign 
countries are directly involved in bailouts. In the absence of bailouts, the excess debt is a 
sufficient condition for default. Our results based upon panel data were that: 
In the cases where the debt was rescheduled/defaulted, the excess debt was 
positive in 84% of the cases. In the cases where there was no reschedule/default, the 
excess debt was positive in 47% of the cases. 
 
4.2 Mexico and Tunisia 
Mexico defaulted to official and to private creditors during the period 1983-96, 
whereas Tunisia did not. The optimal debt/net worth ratio f* has the form: ft* = azt + f(0), 
where zt is the risk adjusted net return (b-r)/σ
2  , f(0) is a constant, which is almost always 
negative, and a is the reciprocal of risk aversion. This equation applies to all of the 
models, suitably interpreted according to the equation in parts 2 and 3 above. Excess debt 
                                                 
22 Define default/renegotiation as a condition where the scheduled debt service is not paid on the due date 
under the original contracted conditions. J. L. Stein, Overview  28
is Ψt = ft - f* = ft - (azt + f(0)). Table 1 describes the relevant data from which one can 
infer that there was an excess debt in Mexico and not in Tunisia. 
 
Table 1.  Mexico and Tunisia 1979 - 2001 
Variable  Mexico - default  Tunisia - no default 
Debt/GDP  f  0.45  0.61 
Mean net return (b-r)  0.057  0.107 





2  2.23 13.21 
Optimal ft* = azt + f(0),  
f(0) < 0, a = 1/(1-γ) 
 a(2.23) + f(0)  a(13.21) + f(0) 
ω = f - (fmax)  0.322 -0.116 
Ψ = f −(az + f(0))  0.45 - (2.23a + f(0))  .61 - (13.2a + f(0)) 
 
Compare table 1 with the conclusions marked by bullets above. First: Tunisia, which did 
not default, had a higher debt ratio than did Mexico, which defaulted. Second: assuming 
that the constant f(0) < 0 was relatively similar in both countries, the risk adjusted net 
return z was very much higher in Tunisia. For any coefficient of risk aversion, the 
optimal debt ratio should be much higher in Tunisia than in Mexico. Alternatively, if the 
debt ratio in Tunisia was close to the optimal ft* = azt + f(0), described line U-S, the 
Mexican debt ratio was far above the line. See the last row in table 1. Third: the Mexican 
debt ratio was above the maximal debt in figure 1-1, defined in equation (8). The excess 
debt, which leads to a probability of default in the bad case, is ω in the next to last row. It 
is very large and positive. By contrast, Tunisia did not have an excess debt. The ω for 
Tunisia was negative; the debt ratio was below the debt-max level.  
 
4.3.  Argentina: From Triumph to Defaults 
Severe crises result from an interaction between an excess debt and a misaligned 
exchange rate. Misaligned exchange rates are discussed in part 5. In the present section, 
we give an example of how we apply the SOC/DP analysis of excessive debt to J. L. Stein, Overview  29
Argentina that went from Triumph in the early 1990's to Tragedy in 2001. Warning 
Signals are obtained based upon available information. In part 7, we (i) compare our 
theoretically based EWS of currency and debt crises with the eclectic-econometric 
approach in the literature, and (ii) give an example of how the interaction between an 
overvalued exchange rate Φ > 0 and an excess debt Ψ > 0   provided EWS of the 1997-98 
crisis in Thailand.  
Michael Mussa's (2002) retrospective description
23, and the International 
Monetary Fund's Independent Evaluation Office Report (2004), of the Argentine crisis 
can be integrated with the SOC/DP analysis above. A new economic policy - the 
convertibility plan - was instituted in the spring of 1991 to deal with the hyperinflation 
that existed at the beginnings of the 1990s. The currency was pegged to the $US and a 
currency board arrangement limited domestic money creation. This plan was successful. 
During the period 1993-98, the inflation rate was below 3% and the growth rate was 
about 4% per annum. Whereas most of the miracle Asian economies collapsed into crisis 
from mid 1997 to early 1998, Argentina became the darling of the world credit market. It 
was able to float large issues of medium to long-term debt on the world credit markets at 
comparatively modest spreads over the US Treasuries. 
Not only did the world credit markets and the International Monetary Fund 
applaud the Argentine policies, but also several academic economists viewed Argentina 
as a model of growth. Dornbusch (Lecture II: 1998) wrote: "A currency Board 
arrangement, a fixed exchange rate and a central bank that has no discretionary power 
over the money supply…is a very good system…One spectacularly successful case…is 
Argentina…the Argentine experience is the one that deserves most attention because, 
one, it has lasted, and two, it has been extremely successful as a cornerstone of reform in 
an economy, and three, it has produced an average growth of six per cent". 
Barely a few years later in 2001, Argentina's decade long experiment ended in 
tragedy. The banking system was effectively closed at the beginning of December 2001, 
the exchange peg was gone, the peso was trading at substantially depreciated rate against 
the $US. Argentina defaulted on its sovereign debt and was transformed within barely 
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two years from the darling of the emerging market finance to "the world's leading 
deadbeat". 
The reason why the financial markets, the International Monetary Fund and 
academic economists failed to anticipate the crisis was that their attention was focused 
upon the monetary sphere - since inflation is a monetary phenomenon - and not upon the 
external debt. The debt did not alarm them because the debt did not seem to be high 
relative to that prevailing in many industrial countries. A benchmark of an excessive debt 
was lacking. Our analysis implies that debt crises are not produced by the level of the 
debt/GDP but by the excess of the actual debt over the optimum debt ratio. 
 The fundamental causes of the disaster were the growth in social (public plus 
private) consumption and a fixed nominal exchange rate pegged to the $US. The various 
levels of the Argentine governments succumbed to political pressures to spend 
significantly more than was raised by taxes. Much of the fiscal problems arose because 
the provinces retained the initiative for public spending, but the central government was 
ultimately responsible for raising revenues and servicing the debt. Since Argentina was 
thought of so highly by the financial markets, it was able to finance the excess spending 
by borrowing US dollars in the international markets at favorable interest rates.  
An excess debt means that the debt ratio rises above the curve U-S in figure 1-2. 
In the Prototype model, the optimal debt ratio is equation (7) and in the Ergodic Mean 
Reversion model it is equation (7a). These equations are valid if the mean return is 
changing slowly relative to the Brownian Motion terms. A relatively general way of 
taking all of these factors into account is to graph the normalized variables. The 
normalized return to investment b*t = [bt - E(b)]/σb labeled B1_AR in figure 1-3. It is the 
deviation of the return from its longer-term mean per unit of risk
24. The external $US 
denominated debt/GDP, labeled DBTGDP_AR in figure 1-3, is also normalized. It is 
equal to the (debt/GDP - mean)/standard deviation. The debt ratio rose by two standard 
deviations from 1992-2001. However, the return on investment b*t was declining from 
1997-2001.  
The rise in the actual debt ratio and the decline in b*t the return/risk in figure 1-3 
corresponds to a rise in the debt ratio above the curve U-S for the optimal debt ratio in 
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figure 1-2. An "excess debt" is generated. Insofar as there is an excess debt, the expected 
growth rate of GDP declines and its variance rises. The variance comes from the external 
shocks, which are disturbances to the productivity of capital (GDP/capital), the real rate 
of interest, and their correlation. Because of the non-optimal government policies, the 
Argentine economy became more vulnerable to shocks of the net return from its longer- 
term mean.  
The major shock was the collapse of Brazil's crawling peg early in 1999, which 
led to a negative shock to the Argentine productivity of capital. When Argentina was 
forced to depreciate its currency- abandon the peg - the real rate of interest was positively 
shocked, because the debt was denominated in $US. Consumption would have to be 
reduced, if Argentina was to service her debts. Confronted with this choice, Argentina 
defaulted.  
Our conclusion is that there was an Early Warning Signal (EWS) of a sustained 
excessive debt, based upon available information. The debt ratio per se is not an EWS, 
whereas the excess debt Ψ = f −(az + f(0)) is an EWS of a debt problem/crisis/default/ 
renegotiation. Theoretically this is the movement of the debt ratio above the curve US, 
and empirically it is that b*t = (bt - mean)/st. dev is falling significantly but the debt/GDP 
ratio is rising significantly for a period of years. This approach allows for gradual 
structural change in the productivity of capital. Another aspect of the crisis is a 
misaligned exchange rate, relative to the NATREX equilibrium exchange rate discussed 
in the next section, Φt > 0. An example of the interaction between excess debt and 
misaligned exchange rates is the provided in part 7 concerning the crisis in Thailand 
1997-98. 
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Figure 1-3. Debt/GDP (DBTGDP_AR) normalized, return on investment per unit of risk 
(B1_AR) = (bt - mean)/st. dev. 
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5. Equilibrium Exchange Rates and Misalignment 
The optimal debt ratio f* developed in the previous sections is a normative           
concept, according to the criteria discussed in section (3.1) above. The evolution of the 
actual debt ratio Ft = Lt/Yt  results from decisions made by the private and public sectors, 
which may be far from optimal.                   
The actual external debt Lt, net liabilities to foreigners, grows insofar as     
absorption At of resources (consumption plus investment) by the private and public 
sectors exceeds the Gross National Product (GNP = Yt - rtLt). Equation (9) is the change 
in the debt/GDP, which can be expressed in three equivalent ways. The first part stresses 
absorption plus debt service, the second part stresses the current account deficit (rtLt - Bt), 
and the third part stresses investment less saving. 
   
(9) dLt /Yt = [(At /Yt ) - 1] + rt (Lt /Yt )  = (rtLt - Bt)  = (It - St) , Yt = GDP   
Ft = Lt/Yt   , (It - St) = (investment/GDP) - (saving/GDP), B= trade balance/GDP 
 
For example
25, since unification the eastern part of Germany absorbed more than 
the GDP; hence there were current account deficits (rtLt - Bt) > 0. In 1997, public transfer 
payments from west to east were about one-third of the eastern German value added. 
These net transfers took up 4.25% of the West German GDP. Most of the transfers 
financed consumption. Social security benefits amounted to almost two-thirds of all 
attributable public transfers to eastern Germany, subsidies made up over one-tenth of 
these transfers, whereas about one-quarter was for investment purposes
26. 
As long as the Western Germans are willing to tolerate this situation, the Eastern 
Germans can maintain their excess absorption, excess of total investment less total saving 
or balance of payments deficit. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe CEEC are 
joining the European Union and eventually the Euro area. If absorption by the CEEC 
exceeds their GDP, they continue to run current account deficits, and their external debt 
Lt will grow according to equation (9). It is most unlikely that the other members of the 
European Community would finance their deficits. Then the CEEC would have to 
                                                 
25 Deutsche Bundesbank, "Economic Conditions in eastern Germany", Monthly Report, April 1998. 
26 Promotional credits and tax concessions for stimulating the investment activity of the east German 
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evaluate whether the resulting debts are sustainable, that is whether they will be 
exceeding the optimal levels discussed above.  
The real exchange rate is a crucial variable in determining the evolution of the 
external debt, dLt = rtLt - Bt, because the real exchange rate Rt is a basic determinant of 
the trade balance Bt. Conversely, the level of the debt is a basic determinant of the 
equilibrium exchange rate, as we shall show. Both the real exchange rate and the debt 
are endogenous variables in a dynamic system.  
At any time the real exchange rate produces balance of payments equilibrium. It 
satisfies equation (10) by equating the supply of and demand for foreign exchange. The 
first set of terms concern the "equilibrium" elements, and the second term εt subsumes the 
disequilibrium elements. The "equilibrium" terms in square brackets, investment less 
saving plus the current account, are conditional upon real economic fundamentals to be 
discussed shortly. Equilibrium requires that there is internal balance, where the rate of 
capacity utilization is at its longer term mean, and external balance where the real rates 
of interest at home and abroad are equal, there are neither changes in reserves, nor 
speculative capital flows. The second term εt contains the transitory or non-fundamental 
factors. The effects of speculative capital flows, cyclical factors and lags in adjustment of 
the trade balance to the exchange rate are subsumed under εt .  
(10) [(It - St) + Bt - rtFt] + εt = 0,  E(εt ) = 0 
Medium run equilibrium satisfies equation (10) when εt = 0. Denote medium run 
equilibrium by R[Ft;Zt], where vector Zt consists of the real fundamentals underlying the 
saving, investment and trade balance functions. The medium run equilibrium is 
conditional upon the existing debt ratio, and evolves overtime as the debt ratio Ft evolves. 
The crucial hypothesis is that the actual real exchange rate converges to a distribution 
whose mean is the equilibrium real exchange rate, but there is a considerable variance. 
The manner whereby the convergence occurs depends upon the exchange rate regime. 
The dynamics of the Ft = debt/GDP ratio is equation (11), derived from (9) and 
the growth rate g of GDP. Since the real exchange rate affects the trade balance B, the 
evolution of the actual debt ratio is profoundly affected by the real exchange rate. 
(11) dFt/dt = (It - St) - gtFt = (rtFt - Bt) - gtFt = (rt-gt)Ft - Bt J. L. Stein, Overview  35
In longer run equilibrium, the debt ratio stabilizes at a value that satisfies equation 
(12). The trade balance Bt is sufficient to finance the interest plus dividend transfer on the 
debt net of growth (rt-gt)Ft. A negative debt is net foreign assets. 
(12) (rt-gt)Ft - Bt = 0. 
Summary: The longer-run equilibrium real exchange rate Rt* and debt/GDP 
ratio Ft* satisfy both equation (10) when εt = 0, and equation (12). They are written as 
(13) and (14) to indicate that they both depend upon the real fundamentals Zt. We call 
dynamic stock-flow model - consisting of equations (10) when εt = 0, (11)- (12) - the 
NATREX model, which is an acronym for the Natural Real Exchange Rate
27.  
(13) Rt* = R(Zt) 
(14) Ft* = F(Zt). 
This is a model of positive economics and there is no presumption that the saving, 
investment and trade balance are optimal. The resulting equilibrium debt ratio is F*. For 
example, Populist governments (Argentina) pursue  fiscal policies that raise the social 
consumption ratio above the discount rate of a "representative agent", or the Asian 
governments pursue monetary and subsidy policies that stimulate non-productive 
investment. The policies pursued in these cases lead to "equilibrium" debt ratios that were 
not optimal in the sense explained in parts 2 and 3.   
The probability of a debt crisis is positively related to Ψt = F*t - f*t the market 
equilibrium debt ratio F* minus the optimal debt ratio f* discussed earlier. We explain 
that exchange rate crises arise from exchange rate overvaluation, defined as the deviation 
of the actual from the equilibrium real exchange rate Φt = Rt - R(Zt) > 0. There is an 
interaction between excess debt Ψt > 0 and overvalued exchange rates Φt >0. Therefore, 
the two types of crises are inter-related. 
 
5.1 Populist and Growth Scenarios 
The NATREX model is a technique of analysis that can be adapted to almost any 
situation and country
28. The purpose of the model is to understand the effects of policies 
                                                 
27 The NATREX appellation was suggested by Liliane Crouhy-Veyrac who compared the model to 
Wicksell's "natural" rate of interest. 
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and external disturbances upon the trajectories of the equilibrium real exchange rate Rt 
and equilibrium debt ratio Ft . The model specifies the equilibrium values (Rt, Ft) which 
depend upon the vector of fundamentals Zt. Insofar as the fundamentals vary over time, 
the equilibrium real exchange rate and debt ratio will vary over time, as indicated in 
equations (13) and (14). The equilibrium debt ratio in (14) is conditional upon the saving 
and investment decisions of the public plus private sectors. They may or may not be the 
optimal decisions derived on parts 2 and 3. Insofar as the "equilibrium" debt ratio Ft = 
F(Zt) deviates from the optimal ratio f*, the former is less sustainable. 
The logic and insights of the NATREX model
29 can be summarized in two 
scenarios
30. Each scenario concerns different elements in the vector Zt of the 
fundamentals, and has different effects upon the equilibrium trajectories of the real 
exchange rate NATREX and of the external debt. NATREX analysis concerns the 
equilibrium real exchange rate and it is neither the actual real exchange rate nor the 
optimal exchange rate that would lead to the optimal debt ratio sketched in parts 2 and 3. 
The core of the dynamic system relating the real exchange rate and the debt is equation 
(11). 
The first scenario, called the Populist scenario, involves a decline in the ratio of 
social saving/GDP. This could occur when the government incurs high-employment 
budget deficits, lowers tax rates that raise consumption, or offers loan 
guarantees/subsidies for projects with low social returns. This represents rise in the 
consumption ratio/a decline in the saving ratio, a shift in the S function in equations (10) 
and (11). These Populist expenditures are designed to raise the standards of 
consumption/quality of life for the present generation.  
The second scenario, called the Growth scenario, involves policies designed to 
raise the productivity of capital bt = Yt /Kt. Policies that come to mind involve the 
liberalization of the economy, increased competition, wage and price flexibility, the 
deregulation of financial markets, improved intermediation process between savers and 
                                                 
29 The NATREX model is the subject of Stein, Allen et al (1995, 1997). It differs from Williamson's FEER 
model (1994) and from the behavioral econometric approach BEER of Clark and MacDonald (1999). See 
MacDonald and Stein (1999, ch. 1) and Driver and Westaway (2005) for a comparison of different 
approaches. 
30 A graphic and mathematical analysis of the scenarios is in chapter four. Here, we just present an intuitive 
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investors, and an honest and objective judicial system that enforces contracts. Growth 
policies improve the allocation of resources and bring the economy closer to the 
boundary of an expanding production possibility curve
31.  
Table 1 summarizes the differences between the two scenarios in the medium and 
the long run. The stories behind the dynamics are as follows. 
The Populist scenario involves increases in social (public plus private) 
consumption relative to the GDP. External borrowing must finance the difference 
between investment and saving.  The capital inflow appreciates the real exchange rate 
from initial level R(0) to medium run equilibrium R(1), where T = 1 denotes medium run 
equilibrium. The current account deficit is balanced by the capital inflow. The debt rises, 
since the current account deficit is the rate of change of the debt - equation (11). Current 
account deficits lead to growing transfer payments rtFt. This Populist scenario is 
potentially dynamically unstable because the increased debt raises the current account 
deficit, which then increases the debt further. The exchange rate depreciates, and the debt 
rises, steadily.  
Stability can only occur if the rise in the debt, which lowers net worth equal to 
capital less debt, reduces social consumption/raises social saving. For example, the 
growing debt and depreciating exchange rate force the government to diminish the high 
employment budget deficit. Thereby, saving less investment rises. Long-run equilibrium 
(denoted by T = 2) is reached at a higher debt F(2) > F(0) and a depreciated real 
exchange rate R(2) < R(0). The longer-run depreciation of the exchange rate R(2) < R(0) 
can be understood from equation (12). The debt is higher than initially. Therefore, the 
trade balance B(2) must be higher than initially to generate the foreign exchange to 
service the higher transfers
32 rtF(2). The real exchange rate must depreciate to R(2) < 
R(0) in order to raise the trade balance to B(2).  
The top half of table 2 summarizes the Populist scenario in the medium-run (T = 
1) and the longer-run (T = 2). The rise in the debt is monotonic from F(0) to F(2). The  
                                                 
31 To be sure, there will be short-run adverse effects as unprofitable enterprises are closed. The net effect in 
the shorter-run is to reduce employment and raise productivity. In the medium run, both productivity and 
employment grow. 
 
32 The interest rate must exceed the growth rate if the expected present value of future income is finite. J. L. Stein, Overview  38
trajectory of the real exchange rate is not monotonic. It first rises to R(1) > R(0), and then 
falls to an equilibrium level R(2) < R(0).  
Table 2 





 T = 1 
Longer-run 
T = 2 
Populist:  
Rise in social in social consumption (discount rate, 
time preference), rise in high employment government 
budget deficit, decline social saving 
 
appreciation 
R(1) > R(0) 
Debt rises 
F(1) > F(0) 
depreciation 
R(2) < R(0) < R(1) 
Debt rises 
F(2) > F(1) > F(0) 
Growth oriented:  
Rise in productivity of investment, expansion of 
production possibility set. Rise in growth, rise in 
competitiveness 
appreciation 
R(1) > R(0) 
Debt rises 
F(1) > F(0) 
appreciation 
R(2) > R(1) > R(0) 
Debt declines 
F(2) < F(0) < F(1) 
R = real exchange rate (rise is appreciation), F = external debt/GDP; initial period T = 0, 
medium run T=1, long-run T=2.  
 
The    Growth scenario is summarized in the lower half of table 1. Since the 
GDP/capital is b = Y/K, the growth of the GDP is g in equation (15). It is the sum of two 
terms: (i) product of the current productivity of capital b and the investment ratio (I/Y) 
and (ii) the growth of the productivity of capital db/b. 
(15) g = dY/Y = b(I/Y) + db/b 
The perturbation is a rise in the productivity of investment b and an expansion of 
the production possibility set. Investment rises because of the rise in b the rate of return. 
The difference between investment and saving is financed by a capital inflow. The 
exchange rate appreciates to R(1) > R(0) which reduces the trade balance and produces a 
current account deficit. The initial current account deficit  equal to [I(0) - S(0)] raises the 
debt. The trade deficit is used to obtain the resources to finance capital formation, which 
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It does not matter much where the rise in the return on investment occurred or 
what factors led to an expansion of the production possibility set. If they are in the 
traditional export or import competing sectors, the trade balance function B = B(R;b) 
increases. The B function, which relates the real value of the trade balance to the real 
exchange rate R, increases with a rise in b and in the overall productivity of the economy. 
For example, the reallocation of resources leads to the production of higher quality/value 
goods that can compete in the world market. If the rate of return on investment and 
productivity increase in the sectors that are not highly involved in international trade, 
resources can then be released for use in the more traditional "tradable" sectors. Again, 
the B function supply curve increases.  
The identification of "tradable" with manufacturing and "nontradable" with 
services sectors is problematic. For example services of all kinds, especially financial 
services, are very important exports for the United States, and cannot be considered as 
"nontradable". Another example is that the trends in the real exchange rate of both the 
major countries, the EU as well as the CEEC are dominated by the real exchange of 
"traded" goods, and the relevance of the Balassa-Samuelson effect is difficult to discern, 
as shown by Duval (2002) for the synthetic euro-$US real exchange rate. 
When the return on investment b and productivity rise as a result of the more 
efficient allocation of resources, saving, investment, the growth rate and trade balance 
function increase. Investment increases because it is positively related to the net return on 
capital (b-r). The rise in the productivity of capital raises the growth rate in (15) because 
both terms rise. Saving/GDP is ultimately positively related to the productivity of capital 
b and negatively to the discount rate. Saving less investment tends to rise. The rise in 
productivity b increases the trade balance B = B(R;b) at any real exchange rate.  
The trajectory to longer-run equilibrium differs from that in the Populist scenario. 
The crucial aspect implied by the Growth Scenario is that, at medium run equilibrium 
exchange rate R(1), the trade balance function increases relative to the saving less 
investment function. The real exchange rate appreciates and there are now current account 
surpluses, excess of saving over investment. As a result, the debt then declines to a new 
equilibrium F(2) < F(0). The trajectory of the debt is not monotonic. The net effect in the 
longer-run can be understood from equation (12). The debt is lower, the growth rate is J. L. Stein, Overview  40
higher and the trade balance function B has shifted to the right. The long-run equilibrium 
exchange rate must appreciate to reduce B to equal the lower value of (r-g)F*.  
The dynamic process in the Growth scenario is summarized in the lower half of 
table 2. The real exchange rate appreciates steadily to a higher level R(2) > R(1) > R(0). 
The external debt reaches a maximum and then declines to F(2) < F(0) < F(1).  
 
5.2 The Nominal Exchange Rate: PPP and the NATREX 
 
The most frequently used estimate of the equilibrium nominal exchange rate is 
based upon the Purchasing Power Parity PPP hypothesis. The NATREX model is very 
different from the Purchasing Power Parity PPP hypothesis. The PPP arbitrarily assumes 
that the equilibrium real exchange rate is a constant. PPP is not based upon economic 
theory, and the associated studies are simply eclectic-econometric exercises. PPP cannot 
and does not purport to explain what determines the equilibrium exchange rate, what are 
the effects of policy/control variables and exogenous variables upon the equilibrium real 
exchange rate. Hence it is not particularly useful for policy questions. For example, PPP 
is unable to answer the following significant questions: At what exchange rate should the 
CEEC enter the Euro area, to avoid the problems that occurred with the integration of 
East Germany? What policies will be consistent or inconsistent with the established 
exchange rates to avoid deflationary or inflationary pressures? How can one explain the 
trends in the values of the Euro and the US dollar? How can one derive Early Warning 
Signals of an exchange crisis such as Thailand in 1997?  
The NATREX model implies that one would observe PPP in the long-run only if 
R(Zt) in equation (13), a linear combination of the fundamentals, is mean reverting in the 
longer run. The PPP model is a special case of the NATREX model. The relation 
between the two models can be understood from figure 1-4 and equation (16). The 
logarithm of the equilibrium nominal exchange rate
33 denoted log N
e
t has two 
components: the logarithm of the equilibrium real exchange rate, log R[Zt] which is the 
NATREX, and the logarithm of the ratio of relative domestic/foreign "prices"
34 denoted 
                                                 
33 A rise in the nominal or real exchange rate is an appreciation of the currency. 
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log [pt/p*t]. The PPP ignores the R(Zt) term by assuming that it is a constant, and focuses 
exclusively upon the relative price term. The NATREX is not a constant, but varies with 




t = log R[Zt] - log [pt/p*t].  
Figure1- 4 describes three values of R(Z), where R(Z=1) is the most appreciated 
NATREX, R(Z=2) is the most depreciated value and R(Z=0) is the mean NATREX. 
Suppose that Z = 0 and the corresponding equilibrium real exchange rate NATREX is 
R(0). Then the equilibrium nominal exchange rate is a set of points along line R(0). The 
PPP relation would hold as long as the NATREX remained constant. If the nominal 
exchange rate were above the line R(0), the currency is overvalued. There cannot be 
internal and external equilibrium. The country would have difficulty competing in 
international markets. It would either lose reserves and the external debt/GDP ratio would 
rise, or there would be depressed economic conditions, particularly if the monetary/fiscal 
authorities attempt to stem the excess demand for foreign exchange. Similarly, if the 
nominal exchange rate were below the line, then reserves would rise or there would be 
inflationary pressures. Nominal exchange rates either above or below the line are 
unsustainable. Either the nominal exchange rate or relative prices must adjust, if both 
internal and external equilibrium are to prevail.  
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Figure 1-4. The equilibrium nominal exchange rate, the NATREX and relative prices. If 
the NATREX varies between R(1) and R(2), and relative prices vary between c and d, the 
equilibrium nominal exchange rate will be contained in the rectangle. 
 
The NATREX changes with the fundamentals vector Zt, as described in the two 
scenarios summarized in section table 2. As the NATREX varies between R(1) and R(2) 
and relative prices vary between c and d, the equilibrium nominal exchange rate will be 
contained in the rectangle. A regression of the nominal exchange rate upon relative prices 
would be based upon the scatter of points in the rectangle. If the relative prices are 
constant at log [pt/p*t] = 0, then the equilibrium nominal exchange rate varies from a to b. 
If the nominal exchange rate is fixed at log Nt = 0, then relative prices must vary between 
c and d. 
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6. Examples:  NATREX as a guide to Policy - The Euro and the United States Dollar 
The NATREX model can be a guide to policy. It can help to answer the question: 
what policies should be followed such that the nominal exchange rate is sustainable. The 
only way to evaluate if the nominal exchange rate is consistent with the equilibrium in 
equation (16) is to directly estimate the NATREX in equation (13) and use this estimate 
as R[Zt] in (16) along with an estimate of relative prices. We now provide several 
examples as to how this is done.       
           A lesson for the CEEC who are contemplating entering into the Euro area is to 
evaluate whether the selected nominal exchange rate is consistent with equations (13) and 
(16). If the nominal rate is above the line, the economies will be depressed like eastern 
Germany. If the nominal rate is below the line in figure 1-4, there will be inflationary 
pressures. In either case, the situation will not be sustainable. It would be a grave error 
for the CEEC to adopt the Euro without understanding what is their appropriate 
NATREX 
35. 
The PPP hypothesis focuses solely upon relative prices and ignores variations in 
the NATREX, which are primarily the result of the Populist and Growth scenarios 
described above. Initially, the NATREX may be R(0) and relative prices and the nominal 
exchange rate are at the origin. If Populist policies are then followed, the NATREX will 
decline to R(2) and the currency will be overvalued. If Growth policies lead to a 
NATREX of R(1), then there will be inflationary pressures. The NATREX model allows 
one to evaluate to what extent the change in the equilibrium nominal exchange rate is due 
to vertical shifts of the R(Z) curve - variations in the equilibrium real exchange rate - and 
to what extent it is due to movements along the curve - variations in relative prices.  
With the introduction of the Euro in 1999, there was a multitude of predictions  
concerning its future value relative to the U.S. dollar. During the period that the euro fell 
below $0.90/euro and later rose above $1.20/euro, there was a profusion of ephemeral ad 
hoc and contradictory explanations. Researchers at the European Central Bank and in 
Western Europe in particular approached the issue scientifically. They constructed a 
synthetic euro, which is a weighted average of the component currencies from 1970 to 
                                                 
35 Significant studies concerning the equilibrium exchange rate for the CEEC are by: Égert, Tober and 
Lommatzsch, Frait and Komarek,  Breuss, Halpern and Fischer (Bundesbank). These articles have been 
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2000. The challenge was to test alternative hypotheses concerning the determinants of the 
value of the euro and then comparing their relative explanatory power
36. The theory that 
successfully explained the evolution of the synthetic euro would presumably be the most 
useful model to use for the actual euro. A comprehensive collection of these studies of 
exchange rates in Europe was published in the Australian Economic Papers in 2002.  
The researchers concluded that NATREX model sketched above was quite 
successful relative to the others in explaining exchange rate variations
37. An example of 
the results concerning the Euro and the U.S. dollar has been used as a model for the 
CEEC in the studies, for example by Egert and his co-authors. The NATREX states that 
the fundamental determinants of the real exchange rate R(Zt) and the debt ratio Ft are the 
variables Zt in table 2: relative social consumption ratio, relative productivity of 
investment, and relative productivity of labor in the pair of countries considered. The 
signs of their medium run and long run effects are specified in table 2. 
The debt ratio is an endogenous variable and should not be used as a regressor in 
the exchange rate equation. The empirical studies that use the debt ratio
38 as a regressor 
often obtain the bizarre result that a rise in the debt appreciates the exchange rate. Some 
studies find that the debt variable is not significantly significant. Table 2 explains why 
these bizarre results are obtained. For the Populist disturbance, the exchange rate first 
appreciates and then depreciates, but the debt ratio rises steadily. For the Growth 
disturbance, the exchange rate appreciates steadily, but the debt first rises and then falls. 
Hence regression analysis of the exchange rate that contains the debt ratio will generate 
the "bizarre" results mentioned. 
Using the fundamentals Zt for the Euro area relative to the US, one obtains an 
estimate of the NATREX labeled R(Z). The coefficients have the signs specified in the 
model, table 2. Adding the relative price variable, we obtain an estimate of equation (16) 
for the equilibrium nominal value of the Euro. A rise is an appreciation of the Euro or a 
depreciation of the United States dollar. Figure 1-5 graphs the actual nominal value of 
                                                 
36 Very few of the models that feature prominently in the graduate textbooks in international finance were 
operational and even remotely consistent with the data. Hence they were not featured in the published 
research of the ECB staff and by economists in Europe concerned with the Euro and the CEEC. 
37 Some studies estimate reduced form equations and others the structural equations of the model. 
Noteworthy studies are by Detken, Dieppe, Henry, Marin and Smets (2002), Detken and Marin (2001) and 
Duval (2002). See also European Central Bank (2002). 
38 These studies cumulate the current account deficit to obtain a measure of the debt. J. L. Stein, Overview  45
the synthetic euro (EUUSNERMA = $US/euro) and the estimate of the equilibrium 
nominal value (NOMNAT), based upon the NATREX. 
The NATREX is a model of the equilibrium exchange rate, not the actual 
exchange rate. The actual exchange rate is hypothesized to converge to a distribution 
whose mean is the equilibrium exchange rate. The equilibrium rate varies according to 
figure 1-4, equation (16) - because there are both shifts in the R(Z) curve as well as 
movements along the curves due to relative prices. Since the equilibrium nominal 
exchange rate varies with both vector Zt and relative prices (pt /pt*), price stability alone 
is not a sufficient condition for exchange rate sustainability. 
Figure 1-5 shows the undervaluation of the synthetic euro (the overvaluation of 
the $US) in the first half of the 1980's, and in the period after 1996. Estimates of the 
equilibrium value of the Euro from 1999 - 2001 indicated that it was undervalued relative 
to the $US. This estimate is consistent with the significant appreciation of the Euro since 
2001. The euro appreciated from $0.85 in 2001 to $1.29 in November 2004. We have 
therefore indicated how the NATREX model can be and has been implemented to explain 
exchange rate variations. 
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Figure 1-5. Nominal value synthetic euro (4 Q MA), $US/Euro = EUUSNERMA; 
NATREX estimate, equation (16) is NOMNAT, 1970 to 2000.  J. L. Stein, Overview  47
7. Interaction Misaligned Exchange Rate and Unsustainable Debt 
A large literature concerns warning signals for both balance of payments/currency 
crises and debt crises. The method of analysis generally estimates a family of probit 
models to assess the predictability of some vector in anticipating each type of crisis. The 
method of analysis is eclectic-econometric. In section 7.1 we briefly discuss this 
literature. Section 7.2 gives an example
39, the Thailand crises 1997-98, of how our 
analysis of misaligned exchange rates and excess debt differs from the eclectic-
econometric approach in the literature. 
 
7.1 A sketch of the literature
40 
Relations [A] - [E] summarize the literature. In each case, probit analysis or 
something similar is used to evaluate what vector V is the best, or at least a useful, 
predictor or Warning Signal WS. The standards against which the WS is evaluated are of 
several types. First, is the Sovereign rating SR of the major rating agencies Moodys and 
Standard & Poor. Second, are the available measures of expectations by the market. They 
are of two types: direct measures of expectations from surveys, and those embodied in 
asset prices, such as interest rate differentials.  
Sovereign ratings SR use all available information, vector V. Studies [A] 
conclude that vector V consists of: per capita GDP, inflation, external debt/exports, 
default history. After 1998, the vector was extended to include bank assets/GDP and 
interest rate differentials. Studies examined [B] whether the SR were able to predict the 
debt crises. Credit rating agencies argue that SR are used to provide an assessment of the 
likelihood of default, not the likelihood of a currency crisis. However, the macrovariables 
in vector V are expected to be relevant for crises in general. Therefore, some studies [D] 
inquire whether the vector V is a useful predictor of balance of payments crises. 
Most of the studies are concerned with currency/balance of payments crises. The 
components of vector W, which were deemed most useful in predicting balance of 
                                                 
39 A detailed discussion of the application of our analysis to Asian crisis is the subject of chapter six. 
40 Key articles underlying this sketch are by: Berg et al (1999), International Monetary Fund WEO 
(October ,1998), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Cantor and Packer (1996) and Sy (2004). Extensive 
references to the literature are found in these articles. The definitions of each type of crisis and the sample 
periods are in the cited articles. J. L. Stein, Overview  48
payments crisis [C] are: real exchange rate relative to its trend, domestic credit growth, 
M2/reserves, current account deficits short term debt/reserves and reserve losses. 
[A] Sovereign rating ⇐ Vector V 
[B] Probability of a Debt crisis ⇐ Sovereign rating  
[C] Probability of a Balance of payments crisis ⇐ Vector W 
[D] Probability of a Balance of payments crisis ⇐ Sovereign rating 
 [E] Interaction of the two types of crisis 
The conclusions of the extensive studies are not particularly encouraging. First: 
the Warning signals from vector W in [C] had mixed successes. Berg et al show that a 
representative model produces a warning signal in 50% of the cases in which it should 
have signaled a balance of payments crisis. However, in about 60% of the times that the 
typical model issued a warning, no crisis occurred in the following 24 months.  
Second: neither the rating agencies nor the market provided reliable indicators of 
crises. They failed to predict the Mexican and Asian crises. For example, market 
anticipations as embedded in interest rate differentials did not widen significantly prior to 
the Mexican crisis. In the Asian countries, spreads hardly increased in the months before 
the flotation of the baht.  
The lesson from these studies stated by several of the authors, is that one should 
ask whether the determinants of the ratings vector V in [A] is the right set of 
"fundamentals" to predict financial crises. Clearly, the negative results suggest that there 
may be variables other than those in vectors V and W that determine crises. Our theme is 
that the theoretical analyses of misaligned exchange rates and excess debt that are 
sketched in parts 2,3 and 5 above are useful complements of the eclectic-econometric 
approach.  
 
7.2. Thailand Example 
  We conclude this overview of "Optimal Debt and Equilibrium Exchange Rates" 
with the example of the 1997 crisis in Thailand. This crisis was shortly followed by the 
other Asian crises, which are discussed in chapter six. In the Thai case, the two types of 
crises - currency and debt - interacted with each other. This example shows how our 
analysis differs from the eclectic-econometric approach described in section 7.1 above. J. L. Stein, Overview  49
When the exchange rate is overvalued then: if output is at capacity, reserves 
decline and the debt ratio rises. Or if restrictive monetary and fiscal policies are 
implemented to avoid a loss of reserves and growth of the external debt, the economy is 
depressed. The first case characterized the Asian economies before the 1997-98 crisis. 
In the Southeast Asian countries, the governments sponsored and encouraged 
industrialization policies. Investment rose relative to saving and the external debt 
increased, without a rise in the return on investment. In Thailand, there was an interaction 
between a misaligned real exchange rate and an excess debt
41. Figures 1-6 and 1-7 
illustrate these two sources of vulnerability.  
Misalignment Φt = Rt - R[Zt] is the deviation between the actual real exchange 
rate Rt and R[Zt] the NATREX, which is calculated on the basis of available information 
up to time t, as explained in chapter six. The NATREX is based upon the fundamental 
variables in table 2: the social consumption or time preference, the productivity of labor 
and the return on real investment. Figure 1-6 shows that the Baht was overvalued - 
misalignment Φt > 0 - for a sustained period of time prior to the crisis. The main reasons 
for the decline in the NATREX were that the productivity of investment was declining 
and the time preference was rising. 
Since the exchange rate was overvalued Φt > 0, the debt ratio was rising and a 
crisis was becoming more probable. Insofar as the exchange rate was overvalued, it could 
be expected to depreciate towards the NATREX- unless there are short-term capital 
inflows to compensate for a negative current account plus non-speculative capital 
account. Given the rise in the debt ratio, it was not likely that foreign creditors would 
increase their positions at risk.  
The rise in the external debt ratio during a period when the expected net return on 
capital (b-r) was declining meant that the debt ratio was rising above curve U-S in figure 
1-2. Figure 1-7 shows that this situation occurred in Thailand prior to the 1997-98 crisis. 
The excess debt Ψt = Ft - f*t > 0 implies that the economy is more vulnerable to external 
shocks. The expected growth rate declines and its variance rises. Insofar as the exchange 
rate depreciates, the real rate of interest rises because more consumer goods must be 
sacrificed to service the dollar denominated debt. Equation (2), repeated here, shows that 
                                                 
41 The same was true for Korea, as shown in chapter six. J. L. Stein, Overview  50
as the growth of GDP declines and the real rate of interest rises, consumption must 
decline - unless there is an infusion of external capital. 
(2) Cs ds = (Ys - rsLs - Is )ds +  dLs 
 In the Thai conditions, such a short-term capital inflow would not be justified. In 
fact, it is rational that there be be a short-term capital outflow. Then one would observe a 
drastic depreciation of the exchange rate, which falls below the NATREX, and a debt 
crisis where the country cannot service its debt without a sustained and significant 
reduction of consumption. 
This example from Thailand shows how the two deviations, misalignment  
Φt = Rt - R[Zt] > 0 and excess debt Ψt = Ft - f*t > 0, interact to produce crises. The 
misalignment is based upon the NATREX model and the excess debt is derived from the 
stochastic optimal control. In this manner, we give theoretical precision to the concept of 
vulnerability. This Overview chapter has described in relatively non-technical terms the 
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Figure 1-6. Real exchange rate Misalignment in Thailand, Φt = Rt - R[Zt] > 0, where 












Figure 1-7. Thailand. Debt/GDP ratio and net return on investment (b-r). Shaded period is 
the pre-crisis period. J. L. Stein, Overview  52
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